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THE SILENT DOCTOR v.
THE DUTY TO SPEAK
A simple-minded dissertation on the law of libel and slander*
By S. G. M. GRANGE, Q.C.:::
That silence is a virtue most of the time, few men will deny. It is
golden in the famous aphorism, and we have all been brought up to admire
or envy, depending on our sexual persuasion, the strong silent man; in fact
the man's strength varies directly with his silence, for there is no greater
shield of weakness or ignorance. And speaking of men, some Frenchman
long ago, in a spirit of chauvinistic piggery, decreed that le silence would be
the only noun ending in "ence"' in his language that could not bear the
feminine gender. The French have always been reputed to consider the
feminine inferior in substance, though not, of course, in form.
Sometimes medical silence can be savagely eloquent, as John Gay
pointed out 200 years or so ago:
'Is there no hope?' the sick man said,
The silent doctor shook his head.
But it is not that kind of silence I am complaining about. Nor is it the infernal
silence that besets the medical profession when the clarion call goes out from
plaintiff's Counsel in a malpractice action. For professionally selfish reasons,
I cannot condone that silence, although I can well understand the doctor's
reluctance to condemn a colleague based upon his own opinion in what is
not yet an exact science.
What I can neither understand nor approve is the obdurate silence of a
,doctor when his duty to speak is clear. Whenever a doctor is asked his
opinion of the professional competence of a colleague by a responsible
person in the field of health, for responsible purposes, it is the duty of that
doctor to reply. It is my view that he may in his reply decline to state his
views only if he is unfamiliar with the subject or if he feels that by reason of
friendly or unfriendly association, his response would be biased. Otherwise,
he must state what he knows, and he must state it fully and completely
without, as the saying goes, fear or favour.
I think this principle, even this obligation, is generally accepted. I also
think that in many instances the principle is not followed because of fear of
a defamation action. The purpose of this article is to show that such fear is
very largely a phantom.
Let us examine the facts of one case where the problem arises. Under
the Public Hospitals Act' a medical advisory committee is required to con*With much credit to my Research Assistant, Miss Jennifer Bankier, who is very
charming indeed, and not the least bit simple-minded.

**Member of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
1R.S.O. 1970, c. 378.
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sider the merits of every applicant for appointment to a hospital. There is no
way to do this better than to seek the opinion of medical colleagues. There
is no way that the medical advisory board can reach any rational conclusion
unless the doctor whose opinion is sought is prepared to give a full and
honest answer. Please note that the material word is "honest" not "true". As
we shall see, in these situations it is always good to have truth on your side,
but you can win without it.
Which brings us to the problem. Doctors -

some doctors -

fear that

if what they say is derogatory and untrue, or unproveable, they will be subject to large damages at the suit of their irate colleague. To show the hollowness of that fear, we must look at the law of defamation. That law - the law
of defamation - is the despair of lawyers because of its procedural technicalities but its substance is simple enough, and I think in accord with common
sense. Defamation is a statement, written or oral, derogatory of a person, and
is actionable by the person defamed against the defamer unless he, the defamer, had the right to make the statement. If a statement is written, it is
called libel; if it is oral it is called slander.
As I said before, if the statement is true, that is the end of the matter;
the defamed is without remedy. But even if it is not, the defamer may escape
liability. All he need establish is that he made the statement fairly and upon
a privileged occasion. Privilege is two-fold. First of all there is Absolute
Privilege which prevails in Parliament and in the Courts, which gives immunity to the defamers regardless of their motives or their fairness. The theory
is that the business of Parliament and of the Courts could not be carried on
without it, and over-rides the private interest of private citizens defamed.
That privilege cannot, of course, help here, but there is also another privilege
which is not absolute and is sometimes called "Qualified Privilege". In effect
this latter privilege excuses a defamation whenever there is a duty upon the
defamer to speak and when in speaking he speaks fairly. The duty is a moral
one, not necessarily a duty enforceable at law, and to speak fairly means to
speak honestly and in good faith, in other words, without malice. This is so,
though the truth of the statement cannot be established, and even though the
statement is manifestly established to be untrue.
The leading Canadian case on the subject is Arnott v. The College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan.2 The plaintiff Arnott was an Ontario doctor and also the licensee in Canada of a system of treating cancer
known as the "Koch treatment" involving the injection by a hypodermic
needle of a substance called "glyoxylide". The defendant College published
in its Medical Quarterly the substance of its Cancer Committee report, which
stated among other things, "we know the Koch treatment is quackery but the
Council cannot remove a license unless a patient voluntarily gives evidence
of promise of cure by the doctor, and none of these patients will do that".
Apparently the College did not attempt to establish the truth of the allegation
it was based upon consideration of articles and medical periodicals and
public documents, but no deep study was made - but nevertheless, the Su2

[1954] S.C.R. 538.
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preme Court of Canada dismissed the plaintiff's claim, holding, in the words
of Cartwright, I. that
"the report was published on an occasion of qualified privilege and the words
used did not go beyond what was reasonably germane to the performance of the
duty giving rise to the privilege".

Other statements of the Court are as follows:
Moreover, under the defence of qualified privilege, it is not whether the words
are true in fact, but rather were they spoken honestly and made in the discharge
of some public or private duty, and fairly warranted by some reasonable occasion.
While there is evidence on the part of the appellant (Arnott) to the effect that
the conclusions in the publications are in error in respect to the Koch treatment
there is nothing to reflect upon the ability of the authors nor the intent and purpose of these publications. There may be cases where the conduct of the party is
such that the failure to make further investigation or inquiry might be evidence
of lack of honesty or even of actual malice. This is not such a case. The available
material supports the conviction entertained by the respondent's members and
the evidence in this litigation does not suggest other than the respondent itself
acted honestly and bona fide. The jury found it acted without malice.
It is, on behalf of the appellant, contented that even if the occasion were privileged the language used was unnecessarily severe and in excess of what was
necessary to express the view held by the College and its Cancer Committee. The
sentence particularly referred to is: 'We know the Koch treatment is quackery.'
'Quackery' is defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean 'The characteristic
practices or methods of a quack; charlatanry.' The same dictionary describes a
quack as 'an ignorant pretender to medical skill; one who boasts to have a
knowledge of wonderful remedies; an empiric or imposter in medicine.' While,
therefore, no one could probably suggest the appellant is ignorant of medical
skill, it is possible that he be in error and those who honestly believe him to be
so may find some similarity in his practices and methods in respect to the Koch
treatment and the characteristic practices or methods of a quack. However that
may be, the sentence here complained of was used to describe the prescription or
administration of the treatment. It was, therefore, not an expression unconnected
with or irrelevant to the performance of the duty which gives rise to a qualified
privilege. At the most it was an exaggeration, or an extreme statement, which
could be evidence of malice, but, apart from an express finding that it did constitute malice, would not, of itself, remove the privilege.

The only legitimate fear of the doctor who responds to the call of duty
is that a jury might find that he was actuated by malice. Therefore it is best,
as I have said, to decline any comment when you and the subject of your
report have suffered strained relationships, or you and he have been placed
in a competitive social or professional position, particularly when he has come
out of the competition better than you. So far as the substance of the comment is concerned, one should, of course, avoid reckless statements which
one knows or ought to know are untrue; but one should do that in life at all
times and no special injunction to doctors is necessary.
A certain committee officially entitled "The Minister's Committee of
Inquiry into Hospital Privileges in Ontario" recently considered the problem,
and while conceding that the danger of a successful action was very slight,
suggested that:
...

there be legislative protection against defamation actions for doctors, adminis-
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trators, trustees, the College of Physicians and Surgeons, and others, with respect
to information given hospitals relating to applicants.3

The Legislature did not see fit to follow precisely the recommendation
but did expand the former section 10 of The Public HospitalsAct which read:
No member of a committee of the medical staff of a hospital is liable for anything done or made bona fide by him or the committee in the course of or arising
out of a meeting, investigation, hearing or other business of the committee.

to its present form:
'No member of a committee of the medical staff of a hospital or of the board
or Appeal Board or of the staff thereof and no witness in a proceeding or investigation before such committee or Board is liable for anything done or said in
good faith in the course of a meeting, proceeding, investigation or other business
of the committee or board.

This section may not protect a doctor who makes an oral or written
report to the medical advisory committee since he is not, strictly speaking,
a witness; but it doesn't really matter. The sections, both old and new, are
unnecessary, and are but partial codifications of the law. They are designed
only to give comfort to the cautious and to temper this caution with courage
and resolution.
That, of course, is the object of this exercise as well. To those who are
already both brave and resolute, I can only apologize for trespassing upon
their time.
a Minister's Committee of Inquiry into Hospital Privileges in Ontario, Report
(January 14, 1972) at 22.
4R.S.O. 1970, c. 378.

